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About ten years ago, a law firm in Washington D.C. representing a major United States company had occasion to search for a
lawyer in Mexico City. The client, having decided to make a significant investment in Mexico, asked the firm to identify a competent and influential law firm that could assist in interpreting the
laws of Mexico and provide credibility with the Mexican Government. After a thorough investigation, the firm selected just the
right Mexican firm whose partners were extremely thorough in legal analysis and drafting, and who were closely connected through
family ties and personal relationships with the highest governmental officials in the country.
Both firms represented the client successfully. The Washington firm used contacts with its former members in the Nixon
Administration to convince the Administration to issue the appropriate export licenses. The Mexico City firm provided the "hard
law," detailed legal analysis that enabled the corporation to avoid
many problems under Mexcian law.
Thereafter, the relationship between the two firms flourished
and many clients were referred back and forth. The members of
both firms learned over the years to trust not only the others' legal
analysis, but their political judgment as well. The Mexican firm
charged substantial but reasonable fees, as did the Washington
firm. Members of both firms participated actively in politics, and
the political connections of both firms were emphasized to potential
new clients. Everyone seemed very pleased with the relationship.
Three years ago, the relationship was abruptly terminated because of a law passed by the United States Congress. In the process
of discussing the representation of yet another United States company, the Mexican firm was told that it would be required to submit
to the United States company a statement that none of the fees paid
to the Mexican firm for legal services would thereafter be paid to
Partner, Neill & Mullenholz, Washington, D.C., specialist in legislation relating to
foreign trade, former Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs, Agency for International Development.
*
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any foreign official for the purpose of influencing his act or decision, or to induce him to use his influence with the Mexican Government. The firm was given a six-page statement for its partners
to sign and furnish to the United States company.
Justifiably incensed, the partners of the Mexican firm refused
to sign the statement, turned away the business, and severed their
relationship with the Washington firm. The client and the Washington firm were left to explain (to each other and not to the Mexican lawyers) that their abundance of caution in interpreting the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) required them to seek such
disclaimers from anyone to whom they transmitted any funds for
advisory services in any foreign country.
In Senate Report No. 97-209, which accompanied amendments to simplify the FCPA, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs included among more than a dozen examples the following recent reaction of an American firm to new
business opportunities in Latin America:
A multinational United States-based engineering company
spent approximately $250,000 to evaluate its potential market in
Latin America. Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela were considered
open markets for exporting engineering services and establishing
local service branches. One of the major reasons the company
chose not to expand was its uncertain liability under the FCPA
for the activities of independent agents and subcontractors.
Moreover, the cost of policing such activities would have mark-

edly lessened its price competitiveness.'
The second example illustrates that the United States has lost
substantial amounts of export business as the result of the passage
of the FCPA. The first shows that the FCPA caused the United
States to lose valuable friends and influential connections in its
most important neighbor in the Western Hemisphere. 2
Some Congressional opinion holds that the loss of business to
the United States because of the FCPA has been negligible. It is
important to note, however, that no research had been done on the
1. S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981). This report accompanied the proposed Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S.708, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13983-85 (1981), which would amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
2. See Business Accounting And Foreign Simplification Act.- Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1981),
p. 105, for the State Department's conclusions on these points [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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issue prior to passage of the bill. All recent studies show that the
losses to American exports are counted in the billions of dollars and
lost jobs in the tens of thousands. Thus, the adverse effect of the
FCPA measured in economic and diplomatic terms is both deep
and far-reaching. The FCPA is one of the worst examples of legislating morality without knowledge-knowledge of the impact of
that legislation on the domestic and foreign commerce of the
United States, and on public- and private-sector diplomacy.
This presentation will discuss the current status of legislative
improvement on the FCPA. After a brief review of the development of the FCPA and its present state, amendments proposed in
and passed by the Senate will be analyzed in detail. This analysis
will show that the amendments have not solved the underlying
problems created by the FCPA.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE

1977

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

ACT

A.

Background of the Act

In 1977, after a series of revelations that American companies
had engaged in patterns of bribery and corruption to acquire business overseas, Congress passed the FCPA.3 The Carter Administration did little to shape the legislation, and private interests, fearful
of being accused of bribery, did not participate significantly in the
process.
The legislative drafting was done in a rush as well as in a vacuum. Without extensive testimony or any thorough counterbalance
to over-zealous committee staffs, the broadest and vaguest possible
words were used in the statute with almost no legislative history to
guide the government enforcer and the corporate interpreter. As a
result, the lack of clarity in the FCPA and the impractical standards
established therein have created unacceptable burdens for United
States firms.
B.

CurrentStatus andEffect of the Act

The 1977 FCPA has two fundamental features. First, the
FCPA provides stiff penalties against individuals and corporations
found guilty of making payments to foreign officials to facilitate
3. CONG. REC. S13974 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981) (statement of Sen. Proxmire, Chairman of the 1977 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs) [hereinafter
cited as 127 CONG. REC.].
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sales, unless the payments are small and made to low-level bureaucrats to expedite the ministerial aspects of the transaction. Second,
the legislation requires corporations to establish internal accounting controls and record-keeping to facilitate enforcement of the
FCPA by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Justice Department.
The FCPA now establishes liability if an American firm knows
or "has reason to know" that a payment made to a third party
would result in a payment to a foreign governmental official or a
political candidate for the purpose of influencing the actions of his
government.' At least one cautious lawyer suggests that one has
reason to know that there would be a corrupt payment if any payments are made in a particular country because all transactions in
that country are suspect. Perhaps the test should be the reputation
of the agent, or the amount of the commission, or an agent's refusal
to make the representations required by the FCPA. Still others
suggest that if the agent's or the lawyer's family or business relationships are close to high governmental officials, there is a substantial probability that part of a fee will be passed on to a foreign
official. 5
Under the FCPA, small businesses suffer far more than the
large overseas competitor because small businesses must rely on
foreign agents or distributors to make sales. Such small businesses
have no control over the local businessmen, and attempts to intervene in local business practices often cause these small companies
to be excluded. 6
The accounting provisions of the FCPA generated hundreds of
jobs among the "Big Eight" accounting firms, but have cost
thousands of jobs on the production line. Corporate managers
have testified to the Senate Banking Committee that they would
rather avoid the transaction than incur potential liability with increased foreign sales.7
Two years ago, Senator John H. Chafee introduced a series of
the most cautious possible amendments of the FCPA. The amendments were carefully drafted to meet specific objections to the existing legislation. The testimony supports far more extensive
amendments than those originally proposed by Senator Chafee, but
4.
5.
6.
7.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1981).
127 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at S13972.
S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1, at 6.
Hearings,supra note 2, at 139-276, 388-422.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol12/iss3/12

4

Neill: Trade Legislation Improvements
TRADE LEGISLATION IMPROVEMENTS

practical politicians realize that modification of the FCPA must be
gradual and persistent.
II.

THE CHAFEE AMENDMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT

Senate bill S. 708 (S. 708), as introduced by Senator Chafee on
March 12, 1981, forms the basis for a current discussion of the issues in the Senate this year and sets the stage for consideration in
the House next year. It is useful at this point to outline the major
provisions of Senator Chafee's original bill. These are, as follows:
(1) the name of the FCPA would be changed to "The Business
Practices and Records Act"; 8 (2) almost all enforcement authority
would be removed from the SEC;9 (3) criminal liability would be
established only when a corporation or its principals "corruptly direct[s] or authorize[s]" a bribe--eliminating the "reason to know"
test;' ° (4) payments would be permitted where legal and "customary" in the country, if intended only to expedite the performance; I
(5) record-keeping would be restricted to transactions that are "material"; 12 (6) executives' liability for record-keeping would be limited to situations where one knowingly falsifies accounts or
circumvents control; 3 (7) corporations would not be required to
keep records where the accounting costs are greater than the sum
being accounted for;14 (8) new guidelines for enforcement and compliance would be issued; 1' and, (9) statutory emphasis would be
placed on the need for multilateral responses to the issues addressed by the FCPA and occasion would be provided for new legislative proposals. 16
8. Id This provision was introduced as § 3 in S. 708. 97th Cong., Ist. Sess., 127 CONG.
REC. S13969 (1981).
9. See Hearings,supra note 2. This provision was introduced as § 5(a) in S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13969 (1981).
10. See Hearings,supra note 2. This provision was introduced as § 5(b) in S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13969 (1981).
11. Id.
12. See Hearings,supra note 2. These provisions were introduced as §§ 4(a),6 in S. 708,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13969, S13970 (1981).
13. See Hearings,supra note 2. This provision was introduced as § 4(b) in S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13969 (1981).
14. Id.
15. See Hearings,supra note 2. This provision was introduced as § 8 in S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13970-71 (1981).
16. See Hearings,supra note 2. This provision was introduced as § 10 in S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC S13971 (1981).
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The Bribery Issues

S. 708 as introduced by Senator Chafee and as passed by the
Senate does not remove statutory prohibitions against foreign bribery. The FCPA will still prohibit United States corporations from
bribing high foreign officials and, in this respect at least, the bill
does not place United States corporations on a competitive par with
many foreign countries. 7Simply stated, S. 708, if enacted into law,
will not permit bribery.'
The current section 104 of the FCPA would be repealed and
replaced by language which conforms to United States domestic
bribery statutes. The "reason to know" standard would be replaced
with the provision to limit a United States company's liability to
situations in which that company "corruptly directs or authorizes"
the payment. Thus, the conduct of the American party, not that of
its foreign agent, would determine the scope of the United States
company's liability. Recognizing that a United States firm could
authorize a third party to bribe a foreign official by its course of
conduct as well as by express direction, the Senate Banking Committee amended Senator Chafee's bill to cover this situation.' 8 In
all other respects, however, the basic thrust of Senator Chafee's bill
on this point was adopted.
The current law is supposed to permit the facilitation of socalled "grease" payments to foreign officials or employees "whose
duties are essentially ministerial or clerical." This focus on the recipient of payments, rather than on the activities and purpose of the
United States corporation in directing or authorizing the payment,
has caused enormous and expensive interpretative problems.' 9
The Chafee bill's provisions for clarifying the grease payments
exceptions were substantially modified by the Senate Banking
Committee. In this respect, the committee bill2 0 was only slightly
amended on the Senate floor.2 ' The final Senate version would exclude from the provisions of the law payments that are lawful in the
country of the recipient and intended to facilitate performance.
Courtesies, tokens of esteem, hospitality, travel and lodging expenses, expenses associated with the demonstration or explanation
of products and customary expenditures associated with the per17. S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1, at 17.
18. Id at 20.
19. Id at 4-7, 18.

20. S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1, § 5(b) at 20.
21.

127 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at S13980, S13984.
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formance of a contract would also be excluded. In its report, the
Committee emphasized that these specific exceptions needed for expedition of business performance and other similar payments
should not be interpreted to undermine the basic anti-bribery purpose of the statute.22
B.

The Accounting Issues

The FCPA's accounting provisions are intended to prevent
corporations from hiding slush funds such as the ones used in the
1960s by major aircraft producers in many foreign countries.23
Current law is designed to give the SEC a corporate "paper trail" to
enforce the legislation.
Businessmen complain that the law does not indicate the degree of accounting required and that public accounting firms and
their clients have overreacted out of anxiety and uncertainty. A
General Accounting Office (GAO) study on the FCPA says that 55
percent of the firms it surveyed said that the costs of complying
with the accounting standards of the FCPA were greater than the
benefits received from foreign trade. One example often cited is
that of a company that
spent $30,000 investigating a $20 payment
24
to a customs official.
Present and former government officials, including former
SEC Chairman Harold Williams, have argued strongly in favor of
slightly amending existing accounting standards and against the
"materiality" standard contained in Senator Chafee's original
bill. 25 They felt that the application of that accounting standard
would eliminate the evidence needed to track down corporate
bribes. Senator William Proxmire, a principal sponsor of the
FCPA in 1977 and a vigorous opponent of the Chafee bill as introduced, states unequivocally that "the accounting sections are the
heart and soul of this legislation. 2 6
Senator Chafee originally proposed a "materiality" standard
that would simply permit the retention of records in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles when those principles are applied to the preparation and presentation of financial
22.

S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1,at 18.

23. 127 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at S13974.
24. S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1,at 7.
25. Hearings,supra note 2, at 278-372, 483-502.
26. 127 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at S 13974.
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statements. 27 Former and present SEC officials testified that the
threshold standards for accuracy of corporate books and records
and internal controls should be that which "a prudent man would
require in the management of his own affairs." Senator Proxmire
finally accepted this provision and persuaded the
Senate Banking
28
Committee to include it in the bill as reported.
The key element in the legislation is the direct responsibility of
corporate management for the record-keeping system. In the final
analysis, such responsibility is a major step in the right direction.
The legislation and its history ties managers directly and immediately to their corporate records, for purposes of this law, just
as
29
statutes.
other
with
compliance
for
managers are responsible
SEC registrants and reporting companies would be required to
"make and keep books, records and accounts, which in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of [their] assets."30 Those same companies further would be required to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls" and a method of tracking expenditures to assure that
management specifically or generally authorizes all transactions
and dispositions of assets to achieve the-specified goals of the legislation. Again, the law requires that the execution and recording of
transactions be in accord with the will of management.3 '
The Senate also approved floor amendments which would
eliminate any criminal liability for violation of the FCPA's accounting provisions. In lieu of a committee provision that would
require scienter for civil violations, the Senate approved a provision
establishing a defense in a civil action if a company could show that
it acted in good faith and had no knowledge of its failure to comply
with the accounting requirements. The SEC could bring civil action even if it could not show that the alleged accounting violation
was done knowingly, but the Senate amendment would give a company a "good faith" affirmative defense. An individual would be
liable only for knowingly failing to devise and maintain proper systems of internal accounting controls. This limited scienter standard
is consistent with domestic law.
In committee, Senator Proxmire argued most forcefully against
27. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), 6, 127 CONG.REC, S13969, S13970 (1981).

28. Id at § 4(a).
29. S. REP. No. 209, supra note i, at 12, 13.
30. S.708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), 127 CONG. REC. S13969 (1981).
31. Id
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Senator Chafee's proposal to remove the SEC substantially from
the FCPA enforcement picture. Senator Proxmire lost this fight
and the Justice Department was given civil jurisdiction to enforce
the anti-bribery provisions against all companies that do not register with the SEC, in addition to its jurisdiction for all criminal
enforcement.32
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE PICTURE

On November 23, 1981, the Senate amended and passed S. 708
with little fanfare or public comment. The bill has been sent to the
House where it has been referred to Chairman Tim Wirth's House
Energy and Committee Subcommittees on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance. Mr. Wirth says he is not yet
convinced that the FCPA needs amending.
It is uncertain at this stage whether the 97th Congress will pass
some modifications to the FCPA. To the extent that new law
would clarify the existing FCPA and facilitate legal interpretation,
such amendments should go a long way toward eliminating the
type of confrontation that destroyed the relationship between the
Mexican and Washington law firms referred to above. One hopes
that such amendments would encourage a constructive dialogue
among trading partners rather than the destructive, offensive interventions in foreign countries, and the imposition of business standards that are not even applicable to United States domestic
business.
V.

CONCLUSION

If S. 708 is enacted, its most significant amendments to the
FCPA would be the change in its name and the section providing
for a report by the Administration to Congress that includes recommended legislation to amend further the FCPA. A slight modification, adopted on the Senate floor, would require that this report
include legislative recommendations and other possible actions to
be taken if international negotiations do not succeed in eliminating
the competitive disadvantage of United States business. Such
changes would promote future amendments and indeed may, at
some point, permit the repeal of the FCPA.
Finally, S. 708 is a lawyer's bill. It would vastly facilitate interpretation of the law regarding overseas bribery and the account32. S. REP. No. 209, supra note 1, at 20.
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ing issues that arise from the law. S. 708 is not good legislation. It
does not resolve the underlying requirements to balance morality,
economics and diplomacy in shaping a bill that has such profound
impact. The Congress must eventually face this task.
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